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INTRODUC_ON
The ability of aerospace engineers and scientists to identify, acquire, and utilize scientific
and technical information (STI) is of paramount importance to the efficiency of the research
and development (R&D) process. Testimony to the central role of STI in the R&D process
is found in numerous studies (Fischer, 1980). These studies show, among other things, that
aerospace engineers and scientists devote more time, on the average, to the communication of
technical information than to any Other scientific or technical activity (Pinelli, et al., 1989).
A number of studies have found strong relationships between the communication of STI and
technical perfcrmance at both the individual (Allen, 1970; Hall and Ritchie, 1975; and Rothwell
and Robertson, 1973) and group level (Carter and Williams, 1957; Rubenstein, et al., 1971; and
Smith, 1970). Therefore, we concur with Fischer's (1980) conclusion that the "roleof scientific
and technical communication is thus central to the success of the innovation process, in general,
and the management of R&D activities, in particular."
The R&D process can be simplified into two phases: idea formulation and problem
solving (Myers and Marquis, 1969). The literature indicates that STI external to the
organization plays a predominant role in the idea formulation, while STI internal to the
organization plays the more important role in problem solving (Dewhirst, et al., 1978). This
recommendation is supported by Project Sappho (1972) which reported that "one of the
distinguishing characteristics of unsuccem_ innovations was the poor utilization of external
sollrccs in idea formulation" and by Allen (1977) who found a strong positive correlation
between the use of ext_ernai sources and the technical quality of engineering proposals. For
various institutional and behavioral reasons associated with "uncertainty," organizations and
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individuals tend to isolate themselves from and erect barriers to the outside world and to
external STI.
Thus, we speculate that engineers and scientists engaged in the process of aerospace
innovation dizplay a bias in favor of internal STI and against external STI. This paper uses
data collected as part of the NASA/DOD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Research
Project to investigate this assumption by exploring the use of AGARD, DOD, and NASA
technical reports by U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists.
o.
Aerospace Innovation as Information Processing
Information processing in aerospace P_D (figure I) is viewed as an ongoing problem-solving ..
cycle involving each activity within the innovation process, the larger organization, and the
external world For purposes of this paper, the aerospace innovation process is conceptualized
as a process of related activities or units beginnin_ with research at one end and service and
maintenance on the other, t
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Figure], TheAcrospaceInnovationProcessasan InformationProcessingSystem.
Throughout the entire process, ideas and knowledge are being pursued and transferred. The
fact that these ideas and knowledge deal with hard teehnologies, or may be as Allen (1977)
states "physically or hardware encoded," should not detract from the observation that, in
aerospace, the innovation process is fundamc:.tally an information processing activity.
The premise that the process of innovation in the aerospace industry can be viewed as an
information processing activity represents an extension of the axguments developed by Tushman
and Nadler (1980). These arguments trace their origins to, among others, Galbraith (1973)
and Duncan (1973), who have conceptualized organizations as information processing systems.
Uncertainty, defined as the difference between informatiou possessed and information required
to complete a task (Rosenbloom and Wolek, 1970), is central to the concept of organizations
as information processing activities.
I The pmpmition that innovationis a linear process, a view presentedby Myers and Marquis(1969), is _ot
universallyaccepted. Langrlsh,et al., (1972) haverejected=linearmodels"of the innovationpmce_ as unrealistic.
2
1990020816-005
Information processing can be viewed as an ongoing problem-solving cycle involving each
activity within the innovation process, the larger orgs_-_l!zation,and the external information
world. For any given task, each activity, within the innovatio,J process "must effectively
import technical and market information from the external information world; new and
established information must be effectively processed within the work area; deci_;ions and
solutions approaches must be worked on and coordinated within each activity and sdthin the
organization; and outputs, such as decisions and products, must effectively be transfetzed to the
external environment" (Tushman and Nadler, 1980). Work areas must be sensitive to Ccedback
and new information from internal and external sources. Finally, outputs of this process create
" conditions for another set of activiti_, 1;herebyinitiating another information processing cycle.
Organizations involved in innovation are open social systems which must deal with several
-. sourl_s of work-related uncertainty, (Katz and Kalm, 1966). In particular, they must deal with
uncertainty from technical areas outside of the organization as well as uncertainty concerning
problem solving within the organization (Myers and Marquis, 1969; Utt_zback, 1974). The
nature of organizations involved in innovation is such that uncertainty cannot be eliminated.
To maintain stability, however, organizations involved in innovation must constantly strive to
reduce uncertainty to a manageable level (Miller, 1971).
If organizations involved in innovation must deal with the several sources of work-related
uncertainty, then a crucial task of these organizations is to gather, process, and export.
information throughout the work-related activities. Organizations must, therefore, develop
information processing mechanisms capable of dealing with internal and external sources of
work-related uncertainty (Tushman and Nadler, 1980).
However, the units that corapnee the larger organization (fig. 1) are highly differentiated.
They operate on different time frames, with different goals, and with varying professional
orientations (Rosenbloom and Wolek, 1970). These differences in norms 1rodvalues also carry
with them different internal coding schemes which suggest that each uni'r,may possess specific
and unique information processing patterns. Each unit is likely to have different -_ourcesof
effective feedback, evaluation, and support (Tushman and Nadler, 1980). Therefore, while
the larger organization must continually import information from the external environment,
this information must be processed with internal infcrmation and transferred within the
organization and among the various work units. Therefore, the lar_;erorganization must be
sensitive to the differences among and between units that comprise the innovation process.
Specialized feedback, evaluation, and support may be required for each unit to process new
information from internal and external sources (Gerstberger, 1971).
Relationship to External Information Sources
Three factors (task characteristics, task environment, and t:lsk interdcpcndence) combine
to influence the dcgrcc of uncertainty with which organizations involved in the innovation
process must deal. Uncertainty increases as the task becomes less routine, as the environment
becomes more dynamic, and as task interdependence beeom_, more complex. T]_e greater the
uncertainty, the gre_ter the information processing reqv::ements and the greater the need for
information external to the organization (Rosenbloom anc: Wolek, 1970; A:len, 1970).
However, it is the nature of organizations engaged in innovation to isolate themselves from
the outside world, to erect barriers to communications with their external environment, and to
rely on information internal to the organization (Gerstenfeld and Berger, 1980). This behavior
is due in large part to the need for organizations to exercise control over those situations in
which they interact with the outside and because these r,rganizations are frequently involved in
activities of a proprietary nature (Fischer, 1980; Alien, 1970). Numerous studies have fotmd a
strong relatio_hip between successful innovation, idea formulation, and information external to
3
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the organization (Dewhirst, ct al., 1978; Allen, 1977; 2roject Sappho, 1972). The danger, then,
for organizations engaged in innovation is to become isolated from their external environment
and from information external to the organization (Fischer, 1980).
Proposition 1. Informat;on that is external to the aerospace organization tends to be used
less than internal sources of information. The more geographically removed the information
is from the organization, the less likely it is to be used.
Studies of the innovation proc_s indicate that the use of internal and external information
sources is influenced by certain "sociometric" variables such as accessibility, ease of use, "
and technical quality. Allen's (1977) findings reveal an interesting .-elationship between the
frequency of information (channel) use and information (channel) performance, which leads
some to conclude the existence of a relationship between the "cost" and "efficiency" of an
information source. Gerstberger and Allen (1968), in their study of engineers' choices of
information channels, note:
Engineers, in selecting among information channels, act in a manner which
is inLended not to maximize gain, but, rather, to minimize loss. The loss to be
minimized is the cost in terms of effort, either physical or psyeholegical, which
must be expended in order to gain access to an information channel.
Their behavior appears to follow a "law of least effort" (Zipf, 1949). According to this law,
individuals, when choosing among several paths to a goal, will base their decision upon the
single criterion of "least average rate of probable work."
According to Gerstberger and Allen (1968), engineers appear to be governed or influenced
by a principle closely related to this law. They attempt to minimize effort in terms of work
required to gain access to an information channel or source. Perceived accessibility appears to
be the primary determinant in an engineer's selection of an information source. This may help
explain the preference for information internal to the organization and support the claim that
the value of information is subjective and user driven. Further, if "effort" is perceived to be a
"cost" associated with information and its value and use, then it is possible that psychological
"cost," the fear of revealing one's "lack of knowledge," m_y also influence information channel
selection and usage.
Consequently, improved quality or perceived performance of an information channel or
source will not, in and of itself, lead to increased use. Engineers will simply not be attracted
to an information channel or source by improving the performance and/or quantity of the
information contained therein--quite the contrary. Investments designed to improve quality
or performance will, for the most part, be wasted unless the information -haJane] or source is
made more accessible.
Proposition 2. Of the various 3ociometric variables assumed to influence the use of an
information channel or source, perceived accessibility exerts the greatest influence. The
greater the perceived accessibility, the greater the likelihood of an information channel or
source being used.
NASA/DOD AEROSPACE KNOWLEDGE DIFFUSION RESEARCH PROJECT
In terms of empirically derived data, very little is known about the diffusion of innovation
in the aerospace industry both in terms of the channels used to conzmunicate the ideas and the
information-gathering habits and practices of the members of the social system (i.e., aerospace
4
1990020816-007
engineers and scientists). ]_.{ostof the channel studies, such as the work by Gilmore, et al.,
(1967) and Archer (1962), have been concerned with the transfer of aerospace technology to
non-aerospace industries.
Most of the studies involving aerospace engineers and scient:'sts, such as the work by
McCullongh, et al., (1982) and Monge, et al., (1979), have been limited to the use of NASA
STI products and services and have not been concerned with their information-gathering
habits and practices. Although researchers such as Davis (I975) and Spretnak (1982) have
investigated the importance of technical communicationq to engineers, it is not possible to
determine from the published results if the study participants included aeronautical engineers
and scientists. It is likely that an understanding of the proce._s by which innovation in the
aerospace iudustry is communicated through certain channels over time among the members
• . of the social system would contribute to increasing productivity, stimulating innovation,
and improving and maintaining the professional competence of U.S. aerospace engineers and
scientists.
The NASA/DOD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Research Project, begun in 1988, is
• directed at achieving an understanding of the aerospace knowledge diffusion process with
particular emphasis on the diffusion of knowledge resulting from federally funded aerospace
R&D. The initial thrust of the project (fig. 2) is largely exploratory and focuses on the
information channels; the information-seeking habits and practices of the members of the
aerospace social system; and the relationships between knowledge producers, intermediaries,
and users.
Informal(Collegial)
Surrogates Producers Information Users
Intermediaries
DTIC • DOO • Aerospace
• TRAC • Librarians Engineers
• DROLS • NASA
• DOD/NASA • Gatekeepers andScientistsJ• NASASTIF _ Contractors _ • LinkingAgents _ • Aerospace• STAR Engineering• RECON & Grantees • Knowledge andScience
• NTIS Brokers Students
• GRA& I
• NTISFILE
It t
Formal
Figure 2. A Model Depic(ing (he Transfer of Fcdcr'ally Funded Aerosp._c¢R&D.
Phase I of the projc_.=is concerned with the information-seeking habits and practices of U.S.
aerospace engineers and scientists with particular emphasis being placed on their useof federally
funded aerospaceSTI products and services. The approximately 30 000 professionalmembers of
the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) served as the study population.
Approximately 65 percent of the study population are affiliated with industry, approximately
20 percent are affiliated with government, and approximately 15 percent are altilisted with
academia.
Approximately 20 percent of the membership was chosen for inclusion in the project. Three
groups containing approximately 50 percent, 25 percent, and 25 percent of the sample were
crested. Each group received a separate questionnaire; the response rate for each of the three
groups was approximately 65 percent.
5
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Data from Phase 1 of the NASA/DOD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Project are presented
in this paper. These reported data are ._q_ecific_llyconcerned with the i1_ of/t'__,AB.D, DOD,
and NASA technical reports. For purposes of this presentation, the data reported herein are
discussed in terms of management and nonmanagement responses. Managers weze self-identified
by their responses to a question about their present professional duties. Except for those who
identified their primary duty as teaching or were retired, the remainder of the respondents were
classified as nonmanagers. Thc data in Tables 1 and 2 were collected by the first questionnaire
and the data in the remaining tables were collected by the second questionnaire.
Use of Internal and External Information Sources
To test Proposition 1, data were collected regarding the use arid importance of in-house "
technical reports, conference/meeting papers, journal articles, DOD technical reports, NASA
technical reports, AGARD technical reports, and technical translations (Table 1) and sources of
information used in problem solving (Tables 2 & 3). In-house technical reports had the highest
use rate (72%) of the seven information sources. In-house technics, reports enjoyed their
highest use rate among respondents having industrial alfdiation _nd U.S. government technical
reports enjoyed their high_t use rate among respondents having government affiliation. In-
house technical repc.-ts were more important to respondents having indastrial affiliation and
U.S. government technical reports were more important to respondents having government
affiliation in terms of performing their present professional duties.
Table 1, Use of an InformationProductby U, S, Aerospace Engineers and Scientists
(Three or more times in past six months)
In= 7981
Percent
Reportype/Sources ofcases
1. In,housetechnicalreports 72
2. Conference/Meetingpapers 56
3, Journalarticles 56
4. DODtechnicalreports 55
5, NASAtechnicalreports 55
6, AGARDtechnicalreports 8
7. TechnicalIranslalion 5
Tables 2 and 3 present the proportions of managers and nonmanagers who used various
information sources in completing a recent technical project, task, or problem. The managers
and nonmanager_ in this study display a preferencc for personalized, informal information
sources. Both groups identified an informal search for information using personal information
sources and contacts as their primary method of solving technical problems. Only after
they have used their personal information sources and personal contacts and have consulted
" formal information sources, do they turn to librarians and technical information specialists for
assistance.
8
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Table 2. Information Sources Used by Managers to Solve Technical Problems.
In - 697 Iof ma,i;v.je,:;I
PercenlSources
of cases
1. Used perso:mlinlormationsources 80
2. Discussedwithcolleague(s) 74
3. Spokewithin-housekeyperson 64
4. Spoke with outside key person 60
5. Consultedlibrarysources 57
6. Searcheda database 50
7. Discussedwitha supervisor 45
8. Checked withoutsidelibrarian 24
9. Checkedwithin-houselibrarian 23
Note: Responsesare basedonthe proportionwho
used eachsourceat any step in the project,
task, orproblemduringthe past sixmonths.
Table 3. Information Sources Used by Nonmanagers to Solve Technical Problems.
[n = 942 fornonmanagers]
PercentSources Ofcases
1. Usedpersonal informationsources 87
2. Discussedwithcolleague(s) 79
3. Consultedlibrarysources 70
4. Spokewithin-housekeyperson 59
5. Discussedwithsupervisor 56
4. Spoke with outside key person 50
7. Searcheda database 49
8. Checked with in-houselibrarian 40
9, Checked withoutsidelibrarian 25
. Note: Responsesare based onthe proportionwho
used each sourceat any step in the project,
task,or problemduringthe past six months.
Of particular significance is the use by the two groups of key persons outside of the
organization. Man_ers turn to experts outside of the organization more frequently than
do nonmana_ers. Otherwise, there are few differences between managers and nonmansgers.
Nonmanagers tend to use library resources more often. It is interestin8 to note, however, that
7
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the proportion of managers who use each information source is smaller than the proportion
of nonmanagers who use each source, except for speaking with key.persons inside and o_ltAide
their organization.
Use and Importance of AGARD, DOD, and NASA Technical Reports
To this group of engineers and scientists, AGARD, DOD, and NASA technical reports
constitute external information sources. The respondents were asked to indicate the number
of times they had used these reports in the past six months. There is some indication in Table 4
that managers use these technical reports less often than nonmanagers u_ them. Neither group,
however, could be classified as extensive users which indicates that U.S. aerospace engin_rs ..
and scientists do not rely extensively on external STI. About 60 percent of the respondents
used fewe. than three technical reports in the six months prior to the survey. The data further
reveal that engineers and scientists who are members of the AIAA infrequently use AGARD
tecluLcal reports; however, nonmanagers are more likely than managers to use them.
Table 4. Use of AGARD, DOD, and NASA Technical Reports in Past Six Months.
[n = 326 for mana0ers;n = 433 for nonmanagers!
ill
Percentof managers Percentof nor.managers
Reporttype
1 or more used Notused 1 or more usedJ Not used
,, II
AGARD 12 88 25 75
,.-K)D 56 44 47 53
NASA 51 49 64 36
Note: Thepercentagesare based on the numberwhogave usableresponses
to eachquestion.
Respondents were asked to rate the importance of AGARD, DOD, and NASA technical
reports in terms of performing their pres._m professional duties. Respondents were asked to
rate the importance of these reports on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 is very important and 5 is
not at all important. The data in Table 5 demonstrate the relative importancc of these reports.
Table 5. Importance of AGARD, DOD, and NASA Technical Reports.
Percentof managers Percentof nonmanagers
Reporttype
Important NOtimportant Important Not important
AGARD 9 57 18 44
DOD 43 23 41 24 ,
NASA 42 21 52 15
Note: The percentagesare based on the numberwhogave usableresponses
to eachquestion. It mightbe assumed that non-respondentsdidnot
use the report, A 1 to 5 pointscalewas used to measure importance.
The totalsfor"1"and "2" werecombinedto determineImportant and
"5" for not Important; hence,totalsdo not equal 100 percent.
8
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Only a small proportlon of the respondents rated AGARD technical reports as important to
their work. Fewer than I0 percent of the managers ant: 20 _ercent of the nonmant_gers assigned
a ::1" or "2" to the importance of AGA._ technical reports. In contrast, over 43 percent
and 41 percent of the managers and nonnmnagers, respectively, assigned a "1" or "2" to the
importance of DOD technical reports. The importance of NASA technical reports was about
equal to that of DOD technical reports. For Lytwo percent and 52 percent of the managers and
nonmanagers, respectively, assigned a "i" or "?."to the importance of NASA technical reports.
. Table 6 contains some of the reasons that we.-e listed in the questionnaire for not using
AGARD, DOD, and NASA technical reports. The reason offered by the highest proportion of
the AIAA members was that the reports were not relevant to their work. A smaller proportion
.. indicated that the reportc were not available. AGARD technical reports were most often
mentioned by managers (30 percent) and nonmanagers (26 percent) as not being available. Few
respondents indicated that the unreliability of AGARD, DOD, and NASA technical report_ was
the reason for non-use.
Table 6. Selected Reasons for Not Using AGARD, DOD, and NASA Technical Reports.
[n= 276. 128, 141 formanagers;n = 310. 210. 142 fornonmanagers]
Percent Percent
Reportlype/Rea:,ons
o1managers of nonmanagers
AGARD
Notrelevant 37 44
Notavailable 30 26
Not reliable 2 2
DOD
Not relevant 38 46
Not available 21 ?6
Not reliable 2 1
NASA
Not relevant 47 48
NOtavailable 15 18
Not reliable 2 1
Note Thepercentagesare basedon the numberwhocircled"yes"
Io the question. The questionwas askedonly of thosewho
did NOT use that report type inthe past six months.
Awaren ._.s and Access to AGARD, DOD_ and NASA Technical Reports
T_ble 7 contains some of the ways respondents learn about the availability of _GARD, DOD,
and NASA technical reports. Both _ and nonmanagers find out about these reports
primarily fzom citations in other publications, followed ckmely by referral by colleagues, Most
respondents reported _hat librarians seldom or never refer them to AGARD, DOD, and NASA
9
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technical reyorts. Citations and c_,leagues as ' he most frequent sources of finding out about
AGARD, DOD, and NASA technical reports would seem to indicate that both managers and
nonmanagers take an active role in the search for information. This finding rein/orces the data
in Tables 2 and 3 which support the proposition that members of AIAA prefer personalized,
informeJ approaches to information. Nc pattern of differences in awareness and access appears
between managers and nonmanagers.
Table 7. How Users Found Out About AGARD, DC'_, and NASA Technical Reports.
[n = 48, 50, 46; 189, 191,182; 174, 177, 170 for managers;
n = 115, 114, 114; 215, 211,208; 281, 21_0,273 for nonmanagers] ..
Percentof managers Percent of nonmanagers
Reporttype/Sources
Used Notused Used Not used
AGARD
Citedinpublication 98 2 92 8
Referredby a colleague 88 12 87 13
Referred by a librarian 59 41 60 40
DOD
Cited in publication 95 5 94 6
Referred by a colleague 92 8 90 10
Referred by a librarian 71 29 68 32
NASA
Cited in publication 95 5 95 5
Referredby a colleague 92 8 91 9
Referred by a librarian 64 36 61 39
Note: The percentagesare based on the numberwhorespondedto the question.
The questionswere asked ONLY of thosewhuused that reporttype in the
pastsix months.
The data in Table 8 illustrate how access requires that the user take active steps to obtain
AGARD, DOD, and NASA tcchnical reports. Many of the respondents indicated that they
obtain AGARD, DOD, and NASA technical reports most often by requesting 'hem from a
library, followed very closely by colleagues providing them with the reports. To a lesser degree,
, responden_ indicated that they accessed these, reports through library referral. As in Table ?,
managers and nonmanagers appear to use similar means to obtain access to AGARD, DOD,
and NASA technicalreports.
10
1990020816-013
Table 8. How Users Acquired AGARD, DQD, and NASA Technical Reports.
[n ,, 49, 50, 46; 189. 191,181; 173, 173. 168 for managers;
n = 116, 114, 111; 214, 212, 206; 285, 282, 27! for qonmanagers]
Percentof managers Percentof nonmanagers
Reporttype/Sources
Use Non-use Use Non-use
i i , i
AGARD
Requestedfromlibrary 88 12 93 7
Obtained froma colleague 84 16 80 20
Routed by a librarian 41 59 36 64
DOD
Requestedfromlibrary 92 8 93 7
Obtained froma colleague 88 12 85 15
Routed bya librarian 46 54 39 59
NASA
Requestedfrom library 89 11 89 11
Obtained froma colleague 88 12 88 12
Routedby a librarian 42 58 36 64
Note: The percentagesare based on the m,,'nberwho respondedto the question.
The questionswere askedONLY of thosewho used that reporttype inthe
past sixmonths.
Quality of AGARD, DOD, and NASA Technical Reports
Certain of the reasons why AGARD, DOD, and NASA technical reports are not used by
members of the sample are contained in Table 6. The data in Table 9 indicate how users of
these, reports rate them on selected characteristics. A substantial portion of managers and
novmanagers rate the quality of the information contained in AGARD, DOD, and NASA
technical reports as good or excellent. There appears to be some concern, on the part of
managers and nonmanagers regarding timeliness and advancing the "state of the art," for
a large proportion of the sample rate the reports as "not so good" on these characteristics.
Further, there are differences between managers and nor.managers regarding the timeliness
and add,racing the "state of the art" of AGARD. About 45 and 61 percent of the managers
and nonmanagers, respectively, indicated that the timeliness ot AGARD technical reports was
"excellent" or "good." Approximately 37 and 60 percent of the managers and nonmsnagers,
respectively, indicated that advancing the "state of the art" of AGARD technical reports was
"excellent" or "good"
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Tabie 9. Ratiqg of AGARD, DOD, and NASA Tuchnical Repods
on Selected Characteristics.
[n = 50, 49. 49; 195, 195. 193; 182. 181,177 for managers;
n = 119. 119. 118; 219. 218. 217; 288, 286, 283 Ior nonmanagers]
Percentol managers Percent ol nonmanagers
Reporttype/Characteristics -- -Excellent Fa=r Excellent Fair
of or or of
Good Poor Good Poor ..
AGARD
Qualityol inlormalion 82 18 88 12
Timeliness 45 55 61 39
Advancingthe "slale-ol-the-art" 37 63 60 40
DOD
Quahtyol information 81 19 77 23
Timeliness 48 52 60 40
Advancingthe "state-ol-lhe-art" 50 50 55 45
NASA
Qualilyof mlormation 93 7 92 8
T=meliness 59 31 70 30
Advancingthe "slate-of-the-art" 62 38 67 33
Note: The percenlages are based on Ihe number who respo:.cledto thequestion. The
questionswere asked ONLY ol thosewhouse"Jthai report type inIhe past six months.
q
I_actors Influencin_ Use of AGARD, DOD, and NASA Technical Reports
Data contained in Table I0 indicate the influence of certain sociometric variables on the
use of AGARD, DOD, and NASA technical reports. Judging from the data, it appears that
no one factor predominates. Relevance and accessibility appear t., exert considerable influence
regarding the use of these reports. To a lesser degree, reliability appears to influence decisions
rega,-ding use of AGARD, DOD, and NASA technical reports.
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Table 10. Factors Affecting Use owAGARD, DOD, and NASA Technical Reports.
[n = 49, 49, 50; 191,192, 192; 181,181,181 formanagers;
n = 115, 115. 116:217, 216, 216; 286, 288, 288 Ior nonmanagers]
Percentol managers Percentol managers
• Reporttype/
Characteristics Greatly Links Greatly Ultks
influenced influence influenced influence
• , ii
AGARD
Accessibility 53 18 57 22
Relevance 56 10 70 7
Reliability 47 18 69 9
DOD
Accessibility 70 10 73 0
Relevance 69 7 73 6
Reliability 50 14 58 9
NASA
Access=bility 78 6 79 8
Relevance 71 4 82 5
Reliability 71 7 73 7
&
Note: The percentagesare basedon the numberwho respondedto the question.
The questionswere asked ONLY of thosewho used thatreport type inthe
past s,x months. A 1to 5 pointscale was used to measure influence. The
totalsof"1" and"2"were combinedtodetermine greatly influenced and
"4" and "5"for no influence; hence,totalsdo not equal 100 percent.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Many technical communicators and other information professionals believe that managers
and nonmanagers have different technical communications and information use practices. This
assumption of differences is based on the presumption that the duties of managers and non-
-- managers are fundamentally different. Consequently, these two gcoups should develop different
etr_' -gies that would, in turn, manifest themselves as distinctive technical communications and
information practices.
Overall, there appear to be few differences between managers and nonmanagers in their
evaluations of AGARD, DOD, and NASA technical reports. While nonmanagers use these
technical reports more often than do nonmanagers, they do not offer different _reasons for
using them. It is, however, beyond the scope of this presentation to speculate further about
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the techni,-_l communications practic_ (similarities and diffcrences) of aerospace managers
and nonm&,agers. We must stress that the data reported in this analysis are preliminary.
Based on this preliminary analysis we do, however, find ev._denceto support Proposition 1.
That is, information that is external to the organization tends to bc used less than internal
sources of information. Further, the more geographically rcmoved thc information is from the
organization, the less likely it is to be used.
We did not however, find evidence to support Proposition 2. That is, of the various
sociometric variables assumed to influence the use of an information chan,le! or source,
perceived accessibility exerts the greatest influence. Based on the prelimin_r? analysis,
it appears that reliability and relevance iafluence the use of an information source or channel
insofar as AGARD, DOD, and NASA technical reports are concerned. ..
If this is true, then the implications of this finding are very important to R&D managers and
to those who provide information services. Improved quality or perceived performance of an
information channel win not, in and of itself, lead to increased use of that service. Conversely,
increased accessibility win not, in and of itself, lead to increased use of that service. Engineers
will simply not be attracted to an information system by improving the quality and/or quantity
of th, information contained therein--quite the contrary. Investments in an information system
win, for the most part, be wasted unless the system contains quality information and becomes
more accessible to the user.
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